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Strategies for creating new informational primitives in minds and machines 
 
Peter Cariani1 
Abstract 
Open-endedness is an important goal for designing systems that can autonomously find new and expected solutions to 
combinatorically-complex and ill-defined problems. Classically, issues of open-ended generation of novelty in the universe 
have come under the rubric of the problem of emergence. We distinguish two modes of creating novelty: combinatoric (new 
combinations of existing primitives2, “resultants”) and creative (new primitives, “emergents”).3 Although combinatoric 
systems may differ in numbers of possible combinations, their set of possibilities is closed. Creative systems, on the other 
hand, have open-sets of possibilities because of the partial- or ill-defined nature of the space of possible primitives. The two 
conceptions provide two modes for describing and understanding change and creativity: as the unfolding consequences of 
fixed combinatorial rules on bounded sets of pre-defined primitives or as new processes and interactions that come into play 
over time to define new primitives. 
We face several related problems. We want to know how to recognize creative novelty when it occurs (the 
methodological problem), we want to understand the creative process in humans and other systems (the scientific problem) 
such that creativity in human-machine collaborations can be facilitated and that creativity in autonomous devices can be 
usefully enabled (the design problem). 
The methodological problem can be solved by the “emergence-relative-to-a-model” approach in which an observer 
forms a model of the behavior of a system. Novelty and creativity are inherently in the eye of the observer, i.e. relative to 
some model that specifies possible alternatives. If the behavior changes, but it can still be predicted/tracked in terms of the 
basic categories/state set of the model, one has combinatorial creativity. If it changes, but requires new 
categories/observables/states for the observer to regain predictability, then one has emergent creativity (creation of new 
primitives). 
 We argue that pure computation by itself can generate new combinations of symbol primitives, but, absent states or 
processes that are hidden from the observer, it cannot autonomously generate new primitives. Breakout strategies are 
therefore required. In order for a computational system to transcend the limitations of its own primitive symbol set, it must be 
coupled to some other non-symbolic, material system. In order to increase its effective dimensionality, it can couple to the 
world outside its internal symbol-states by three means:  
1) via human-machine interactions (facilitate novel insights in humans, use humans to create new primitives that expand 
systems, develop tools for creativity),  
2) via sensors and effectors on an external world (epistemically-autonomous evolutionary robots), and  
3) via internal analog dynamics (adaptive self-organization in mixed analog-digital devices or biological brains).  
When a computational system is augmented and opened up in these ways, it is transformed from a formal system that is 
informationally isolated from its surrounds to one that is self-organizing, self-complexifying, and in informational interaction 
with its surrounds.  
We discuss classes of adaptive and self-modifying cybernetic evolutionary robotic devices in terms of combinatoric and 
creative novelty and in terms of new functionalities that are created (new syntactic states, new semantic observables & 
actions, new pragmatic goals). If adaptive sensors and effectors are internalized in the form of signal generators and 
receivers, it is possible to think of neural networks in these terms. What this view of biological brains might look like is 
sketched out. Adaptively-tuned neuronal assemblies would conceivably function as internal sensors and signal generators, 
such that new signal types could be produced (i.e. new concepts). Emergence of new signal types would increase the 
effective dimensionality of internal signal spaces over time in an apparently open-ended manner. 
 
                                                
1 Academic affiliation: Department of Otology & Laryngology, Harvard Medical School. Mailing address: 629 Watertown 
St., Newton, MA 02460; cariani@mac.com, www.cariani.com.  For deeper discussion see, Emergence of new signal-
primitives in neural networks, Intellectica  2:95-143: 1997 (available on my website). 
2 By primitive, we mean an indivisible, unitary entity, atom, or element in a system that has no internal parts of structure from 
the perspective of that system. Individual symbols are the primitives of string rewrite systems, binary distinctions are 
primitives in flip-flop-based digital computers, total machine states are primitives in finite state automata.  
3 Lloyd Morgan (1931) distinguished "emergents" from "resultants." Emergents are the result of novel creation, resultants, of 
novel combination. 
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Emergence and creativity 
 Emergence concerns the means by which novelty arises in the world. Intuitively, emergence is the 
process by which new, more complex order arises from that which is, in some sense, simpler or more 
predictable. As such, images of birth, development, and evolution infuse our notions of emergence. 
These images provide explanations for how novelty, spontaneity, and creativity are possible and how 
complex organizations arise and become further elaborated.  
 All around us we see the complex organizations that are the emergent products of biological, 
psychological and social processes. Our current discourses on emergence consequently encompass a 
wide range of phenomena: the appearance of new material structures (thermodynamic emergence), 
formal structures (computational emergence), biological structures and functions (emergent evolution), 
scientific theories (emergence vs. reduction), modeling relations in observers,  percepts, ideas, notational 
systems, and economic and social relations.  
 Two fundamental conceptions  of emergence can be distinguished: combinatoric emergence and 
creative emergence.4 These two accounts of the origin of novelty parallel notions of the origin of order: 
"order-from-order" vs. "order-from-noise."5 Where order comes from order, novelty is but a 
preformationist unfolding of latent possibility; where order arises from noise, chaos, or formlessness, 
novelty entails de novo formation of new realms of possibility. Both kinds of emergent orders are built 
up from basic sets of possibilities that constitute the most basic building blocks of the order, its 
“primitives.” Emergence then entails either the appearance of 
new combinations of previously existing primitives or the 
formation of entirely new ones. The primitives in question 
depend upon the discourse; they can be structural, material 
"atoms"; they can be formal "symbols" or "states"; they can 
be functionalities or operations; they can be primitive 
assumptions of a theory; they can be primitive sensations 
and/or ideas; they can be the basic parts of an observer's 
model. To say that an entity is "primitive" relative to other 
objects or functions means it cannot be constructed from 
combinations of the other entities, i.e. its properties cannot be 
logically deduced from those of other entities. 
 
Novel combinations of closed sets of primitives 
 Combinatoric emergence assumes a fixed set of 
primitives that are combined in new ways to form emergent 
structures. Thus in biological evolution, new genetic DNA sequences arise from combinations of pre-
existing nucleotides, codons, and codon-sequences. Microevolution proceeds through novel 
combinations of genes; new genes through novel combinations of nucleotide sequences. Likewise, new, 
                                                
4 This fundamental distinction is paralleled in Margaret Boden’s division of explorative vs. transformational creativity (M. 
Boden, 1990a, 1990b; M. A. Boden, 1991, 1994, 2006). 
5 As Piatelli-Palmarini so elegantly pointed out (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1980), the debate that occurred between Piaget, Chomsky, 
and Fodor ostensibly over the origins of new ideas was really a debate over the existence and nature of emergent novelty in 
the world. The two poles of the debate were held by Fodor, who defended an extreme preformationist view (all learning is 
belief-fixation, from a fixed repertoire of possible beliefs), and Piaget, who defended an emergentist view (qualitatively new 
concepts are created anew). The combinatorial-creative distinction parallels that between ontological and epistemological 
perspectives on emergence. For those who assume an ontological, realist, and/or reductionist stances that provisionally take a 
"God's-eye view" of objects in a universe, all novelty is necessarily of the combinatoric sort – questions of the origins of 
ontological entities are arguably incompatible with an atemporal ontological framework itself. 
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emergent structures and functions are thought to arise from novel combinations of previously existing 
molecular, cellular, and organismic structures and functions. In psychology, associationist theories hold 
that emergent perceptual states arise from novel combinations of pre-existing primitive sensations. 
Whether cast in terms of platonic forms, material atoms, or mental states, combinatoric emergence is 
compatible with reductionist programs for explaining macroscopic structure through microscopic 
interactions.  
 This strategy for generating structural and functional variety from a relatively small set of primitive 
parts is a powerful one that is firmly embedded in many of our most advanced informational systems.  In 
the analytic-deductive mode of exploration and understanding, one first adopts some set of axiomatic, 
primitive assumptions, and then explores the manifold logically-necessary consequences of those 
assumptions. In the realm of logic and mathematics, the primitives are axioms and their consequences 
are deduced by means of logical operations on the axioms. Digital computers are ideally suited for this 
task: to generate combinations of symbol-primitives and logical operations on them that can then be 
evaluated for useful, interesting, and/or unforeseen formal properties. In the field of symbolic artificial 
intelligence (AI) these kinds of symbolic search strategies have been refined to a high degree. 
Correspondingly, in the realm of adaptive, trainable machines, directed searches optimize prespecified  
combinations of features and actions (feature-action mappings). What formally distinguishes different 
kinds of trainable machines, e.g. neural networks or genetic algorithms, are the structures of the 
respective combination-spaces being traversed, and the rules that direct the search processes.  
 
Limitations of closed sets of primitives 
 Combinatoric novelty is a dynamic, creative strategy insofar as it constantly brings into being new 
combinations of elements. However, such combinatoric realms are inherently limited by their fixed, 
closed sets of primitive elements.6 Arguably, all that can happen within such universes are 
recombinations of existing, prespecified symbols – there is no means by which new primitive symbols 
can be created by simply recombining existing ones. One does not create new alphabetical letter types 
by stringing together more and more existing letters – the new notations must be introduced from 
outside the system by external agents. Likewise, in our computer simulations, we set up a space of 
variables and their possible states, but the simulation cannot add new variables and states simply by 
traversing the simulation-states that we have given it. This "closed-world" character of computational 
systems poses fundamental problems for purely symbolic approaches to artificial intelligence and 
artificial life. Godel's Undecidability theorems do not evade this closure.7 Far more limiting to pure 
computation is the inability to make measurements and act on the world directly -- one cannot ascertain 
whether it is raining outside or physically throw a ball simply by performing a computation on symbols. 
                                                
6 Consider the set of all the 6-digit sequences of digits 0-9, (one set containing  106  elements) vs. the set of all sequences of 6 
arbitrarily defined objects (an indefinite number of sets containing 106  elements). The first set is well-defined and closed, 
while the latter is ill-defined and open. 
7 Godel's impotency principles and Turing's Halting Problem only apply to formal systems with potentially-infinite symbol 
strings or machine states (e.g. arithmetic operations on the potentially-infinite set of natural numbers). However, all 
physically-realizable formal-computational systems by necessity have finite state sets, and therefore are functionally 
equivalent to deterministic finite state automata (FSA). For finite systems, the set of computations is finite and bounded and 
therefore surveyable, such that consistency can always be tested within a finite number of steps. An FSA either reaches a 
terminal state (halts) or repeats a total machine state (in which case we know then that it will never halt). Practically speaking 
we are always limited by computational complexity and our own limited temporal existence rather than by imaginary 
computability constraints. Rather than tolerating or celebrating undecidability, we should recognize that logical consistency 
can be proved and paradoxes avoided if systems are kept small (finite) and computationally tractable. 
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Thus, computations play functional informational roles that are completely disjoint from and 
complementary to sensing (measurements) and physical action. 
 As entities in and of themselves, digital computers and formal systems are therefore bounded and 
closed, but in collaboration with human beings, they can greatly facilitate formation of entirely novel 
ideas in their human collaborators. In turn their human collaborators can add new primitives to expand 
their state-sets. Thus human-machine combinations can be open-ended systems that generate new 
primitives. Enhancing human creativity using flexible human-machine interfaces and other "tools for 
creativity" is a much more efficient route at present for generating open-ended novelty than attempting 
to build autonomous self-organizing systems that are creative in their own right. 
 
Creation of new primitives 
 Classically, “emergence” has concerned those processes that create new primitives, i.e. properties, 
behaviors, or functions that are not logical consequences of pre-existing ones. Primitive-creation is the 
central issue for creative emergence, but it also can be asked how the particular primitives of an existing 
combinatorial system came into being in the first place.8 Creative emergence, on the other hand, comes 
naturally to those who adopt the epistemic perspective of a limited, but expandable observer. Primitive 
objects in such a world almost always contain properties that are not be fully known to the observer. 
These hidden aspects can come into play as primitives interact through the underlying material processes 
that subserve them.  
 In this latter view, creating a new primitive entails the formation of a new property or behavior that 
in some strong sense was not predictable (by the limited observer) from what came before. The most 
salient examples of this kind of emergence involve the biological evolution of new sensory capabilities.  
Where previously there may have been no means of distinguishing colors, odors, or sounds, eventually 
these sensory capacities evolve in biological lineages. From a set of primitive sensory distinctions, one 
can list all combinations of distinctions that can be made with those primitives, but there are always yet 
other possible distinctions that are not on the list. For example, we cannot combine information from our 
evolution-given senses (sight, hearing, smell, etc.) to detect gamma radiation. Creation of the ability to 
sense gamma rays, through biological evolution or artificial construction of measuring instruments, thus 
adds a new primitive to the set of perceptual distinctions that can be made. 
 Observables are the perceptual primitives of scientific models. If a given model fails to accurately 
predict the observed behavior of some material system, we may very well require additional observables 
to fully predict or explain its behavior. In this case we cannot arrive at new observables simply by 
making computations on the states of existing ones;  we must go out and construct a new kind of 
measuring instrument that will give us yet another independent window on the world. Each independent 
observable yields a different perspective that is not completely translatable into the states of other ones. 
Each independent observable represents a different category (e.g. mass,voltage, current, temperature, 
velocity, barometric pressure, humidity, tensile strength) and therefore must be given a separate unit-
dimension in a model. Models with disjoint sets of observables thus may not be reducible to each other 
because of different, incommensurable categories. 
 
Evolvable cybernetic devices 
 Artificial devices that create their own perceptual primitives  can be built. The best example– and 
perhaps the only one –  is a electrochemical device that was constructed by the British cybernetician 
Gordon Pask in the late 1950’s (Bird & Di Paolo, 2008; Peter Cariani, 1993; Pask, 1958, 1960, 1961). 
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Its purpose was to show how a machine could evolve its own “relevance criteria.” Current was passed 
through an array of platinum electrodes immersed in an aqueous ferrous sulphate/sulphuric acid 
medium, such that iron filaments grew to form bridges between the electrodes. By rewarding structures 
whose conductivity covaried in some way with an environmental perturbation, structures could be 
adaptively steered to improve their 
sensitivity. Pask’s device acquired the 
ability to sense the presence of sound 
vibrations and then to distinguish 
between two different frequencies. In 
effect, the device had evolved an ear for 
itself, creating a set of sensory 
distinctions that it did not previously 
have.  Albeit, in a very rudimentary 
way, the artificial device automated the 
creation of new sensory primitives, 
thereby providing an existence proof 
that creative emergence is possible in 
adaptive devices. 
 
 One can formulate taxonomies of 
possible mixed analog-digital cybernetic 
devices and their creative capacities (P. 
Cariani, 1989; Peter Cariani, 1992, 
1998; de Latil, 1956; Pask, 1961). The 
devices in my own taxonomy have internal states and operations that link states with each other and to 
the external world (Figs. 2 & 3). The basic functionalities are “computation” (coordination, including 
memory mechanisms), “measurement” (sensors), “action” (effectors), and goal-based “evaluations” 
(measurements of performance that adaptively switch behavior or self-constructions). We think these 
functionalities account for the basic operational structure of the observer-actor. There is the cycling of 
signals from sensors to coordinative 
elements to effectors (outer loop in the 
diagram) and "feedback to structure" 
(inner loops) in which evaluative 
mechanisms steer the modification and/or construction of hardware (sensors, computational, 
coordinative structures, effectors).  
 We initially considered the state-transition structure in simple computational devices, then added 
sensors and effectors to produce fixed robotic devices that couple the internal, symbol-states to the 
world in nonarbitary ways.9 One can then add evaluative sensors and steering mechanisms that switch 
the behavior of the computational part to produce adaptive computational machines. This is the basic 
                                                
9See (P. Cariani, 1989) for the extended methodological discussion of state-transition structure of digital computers, 
computers with sensors, and the rest of the taxonomy. We strongly believe that biological brains are mixed analog-digital 
systems (and not deterministic finite state automata or Turing machines), and hence they are not the digital computational 
corrdinative systems depicted in the taxonomy.Nevertheless, we use digital state-determined discrete-state machines to 
simplify discussion of the operational, methodological problems of distinguishing between types of adaptivity. If the internal 
functional states of a system are analog and consequently, in some respect ill-defined (signal vs. noise), then it becomes more 
difficult and tedious to recognize clearly when a new sensor or effector has been created. This is not a problem if one has 
discrete states whose recognition can be rendered unambiguous. 
Figure 2. A taxonomy of adaptive devices based on primitive 
functionalities of observer-actors. 
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high-level operational structure of virtually all 
contemporary trainable machines that use 
supervised learning feedback mechanisms 
(adaptive classifiers and controllers, genetic 
algorithms, neural networks, etc.). Here the internal 
states and their external semantics are fixed, such 
that the evaluative-steering mechanism merely 
switches input-output (percept-action, feature-
decision) mappings using the same set of possible 
states. This is a form of combinatorial creativity, 
since the machine searches through percept-action 
combinations to find more optimal ones. 
 Consider the case, however, where the 
evaluation mechanism steers the construction of 
the hardware of the device rather than simply 
switching input-output mappings. If sensors are adaptively constructed contingent on how well they 
perform a particular function, then the external semantics of the internal states of the device are now 
under the device's adaptive control. When a device has 
the ability to construct and therefore to choose its sensors 
– which aspects of the world it can detect – it attains a 
partial degree of "epistemic autonomy." In effect the 
device has changed its own observables, added a new perceptual primitive, while retaining its existing 
set of internal states. When the construction process adds a new independent sensor, then the 
dimensionality of the internal percept feature space increases by one. Internal states associated with 
other sensors or other functionalities would need to be reallocated to register the inputs of the new 
sensor, so while the state set remains the same size, its effective dimensionality has increased. 
 Construction of the hardware of the device also allows for the expansion of internal states as well as 
the numbers of sensors and effectors that couple them to the world at large. Adaptive self-constructing 
devices can add new internal states (much as we add more memory to digital computers) that can be 
coupled to new sensors and effectors to form new semantic linkages. They can be coupled to newly 
constructed evaluative and steering mechanisms to form new pragmatic, goal-seeking relations. 
 
Table I.  Modes of creativity with respect to semiotic dimensions 
Dimension Primitives Stable systems 
Maintain structure 
Combinatoric systems 
Search existing possibilities 
Creative systems 
Add possibilities 
Syntactic 
 
states & 
operations 
deterministic-finite-
state-automata 
formal systems 
(fixed machines) 
Adaptive changes  
in state-transition rules 
(trainable machines) 
Evolve 
new states & rules 
(growing  automata) 
Semantic 
 
measurements 
& actions 
Fixed sensors & 
effectors 
(fixed robots) 
Adaptive search for optimal 
combinations of existing sensors & 
effectors 
Evolve 
new observables, actions 
(epistemic autonomy) 
Pragmatic goals Fixed goals 
(fixed self-direction) 
Search combinations  
of existing goals 
(Adaptively prioritize goals) 
Evolve new goals 
(creative self-direction) 
 
 
sensors
alter
structure
evaluate
select
Pragmatics
Syntactics
external
environment
coordinationPercept
states
Decision
states
effectors
ActionPerformance
internal
environment
symbolic realm
Figure 3. Basic functionalities of adaptive systems 
in the taxonomy and their semiotic dimensions. 
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 The functional organization of these various devices has syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic 
aspects.10 Syntactics describes rule-governed linkages between signs, semantics, the relation of signs to  
 
 
the external world, and pragmatics, the relation of signs to purposes (goal states). Creative  emergence in 
the syntactic realm involves  creation of new signs (symbols, internal states) that link internal states with 
other internal states (e.g. perceptual states with decision states, percept-action mappings). Creative  
emergence in the semantic realm involves creating new observables and actions (e.g. sensors, effectors) 
that contingently link the outer world with internal states. Creative  emergence in the pragmatic realm 
involves creating new goals and evaluative criteria.  These various functionalities can be either stable 
(fixed), subject to combinatorial search, or capable  of de novo creation of new primitives (Table I).  
 Combinatoric creativity requires the ability to switch internal state-transition rules ("software") 
and/or sets of existing sensors and effectors and therefore does not require new states per se. Arguably 
creative  emergence  requires the ability to modify material structures or organizations (e.g. "hardware"), 
Figure 4 (above) A solution to the methodological problem of recognizing emergence when it occurs. Concepts are only well 
defined when we have a reliable way of making the distinctions, i.e. in the context of a specificd observational framework. 
 
be it to create new states, sensors, effectors, or goals. It is obvious enough that one cannot enlarge the set 
of internal states by switching among them; one cannot bring new internal machine states into being by 
computing on the old state set. All growing automata require some material growth process that lies 
outside the symbolic description of digital states. In this context, we could speak of analog and digital 
aspects of these devices and their functionalities, the analog aspect being related to rate-dependent 
processes, and the digital aspect being related to those behaviors that can be described by stable rate 
                                                
10 These distinctions originally come from Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (1946)(Morris, 1946; Nöth, 1990). 
8 
independent macro-states and macro-state-transition rules.11 In the language of dynamical systems, 
analog processes are described in terms of rate-dependent processes, while digital, discrete macro-states 
are the macro-reflections of underlying attractor basins. Here new states, sensors, effectors, and goal 
structures must arise out of rate-dependent processes that create new attractor basins that were not part 
of the original high-level digital description.  
 
Recognizing combinatoric and emergent creativity (the methodological problem) 
 How does one distinguish these two forms of creativity operationally? Theoretical biologist Robert 
Rosen proposed a definition of emergence as the deviation of the behavior of a material system from the 
behavior predicted by a model of that system. I have operationalized this concept (Figure 4) -- one can 
distinguish fixed, combinatoric, and creative systems by what one needs to do as an observer in order to 
successfully "track" the behavior of the system over time, i.e. whether one must add states, new state-
transition rules, observables, actions, goals to maintain predictability. 
 
Towards neural networks that create new signals 
 For roughly two decades I have been contemplating what creation of new signal primitives would 
mean for neural networks and our theories of brain function. If individual elements can evolve new 
sensors and effectors, then new signal channels (or modes of signaling) can be created within a network, 
and the effective dimensionality of the network increases. In the brain we can think of Hebb's neural 
assemblies (Hebb, 1949; Orbach, 1998) as internal sensors on an analog internal milieu. The creation of 
a new neural assembly through a activity-dependent modification of neuronal structures (e.g. synapses) 
is the equivalent to adding a new internal observable on the system.  
 What follows is an outline of how a system based on these principles might work. I believe that 
brains require the ability to multiplex neuronal signals and to create new ones. I think it is also possible 
that the signals themselves are temporal patterns of spikes (a temporal pattern code) rather than the 
conventional assumption that these are all firing rate codes. The core issue is whether the information 
resides in temporal patterns of spikes or in "spatial" patterns of activated neural elements (which 
particular neurons fire how much).  
 I also want to caution the reader of the highly provisional nature of this working hypothesis. It is a 
daunting task to propose an alternative brain theory. Although there is some evidence for temporal 
coding in every sensory system and in many diverse parts of the brain, in contrast to our study of pitch 
in the auditory nerve, the evidence at the cortical level is scant and generally underwhelming. On the 
other hand, when carefully scrutinized most rate codes and connectionist accounts explain much less 
than the headlines would have us believe. The nature of the central neural code is still one of science's 
biggest unsolved mysteries, a situation akin to biology before DNA-based mechanisms of inheritance 
were understood. 
                                                
11 Howard Pattee has written extensively on the complementarity between "linguistic" (symbolic, digital, rate-independent) 
vs. "dynamical"  (analog, rate-dependent) modes of describing  physical devices and organisms. See (P. Cariani, 2001b) for 
discussions of symbols and dynamics in the brain. 
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A pulse coding scheme that supports multidimensional signal types permits each Hebbian neuronal 
assembly to have its own dedicated signal type. The most obvious vehicle for multidimensional 
signaling and signal creation lies in temporal coding, where information is conveyed through temporal 
patterns of spikes rather than through across-neuron patterns of activation (which neurons fire how 
much). In parallel with these theoretical concerns I have also spent most of the last two decades working 
on the concrete neurophysiological problems of neural coding of pitch, timbre, and consonance in the 
auditory system (P. Cariani, 1999; Peter A. Cariani & Delgutte, 1996). Here the early representation of 
these perceptual attributes is clearly based on temporal codes. Figure 5 above shows examples of 
different types of possible pulse codes that have been found (upper left), a taxonomy of basic coding 
types (upper right), and temporal firing patterns from both the auditory nerve in response to a harmonic 
complex (lower left) and from a thalamic visual unit in response to moving gratings (lower right). 
Importantly, in the interspike interval representation in the auditory nerve, information is conveyed in 
population-wide interspike interval statistics that support multiplexing of signals related to different 
perceptual attributes and correlation-based mechanisms for separating multiple auditory objects (e.g. 
two notes a third apart played by two instruments at the same time). 
 The existence of population-based interspike interval representations begs the question of whether 
information in other parts of the brain could be represented using population-based temporal codes, 
albeit of different kinds. It also provokes the question of what kinds of neuronal operations and 
processing architectures might conceivably make use of information in this form. This is still very much 
an open question in the central auditory system. Time-delay neural nets (e.g. the Jeffress model for 
binaural localization, Licklider's temporal autocorrelation network for pitch, Braitenberg's cerebellar 
Figure 5. The neural coding problem (from Cariani, 2004). 
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timing model) are possible, but these ultimately require connectionist networks after time patterns are 
converted to neuronal activation profiles.  
 Several years ago, as an alternative to time-delay and connectionist approaches, I proposed neural 
timing nets that operate entirely in the time domain to process information encoded in temporal patterns 
of pulses (spikes) (P. Cariani, 2001a; Peter Cariani, 2002; P Cariani, 2005; P. A. Cariani, 2004). In 
formulating timing nets, I had also been searching for general coding schemes and computational 
architectures that would permit multiplexing, broadcast,12 demultiplexing, and elaboration of signals. If 
one can get beyond scalar signals (e.g. spike counts or firing rates), then what kind of information a 
given spike train signal contains can be conveyed in its internal structure. On which particular input line 
the signal arrives is no longer critical to its interpretation, i.e. one now has an information processing 
system in which signals can be liberated from particular wires. Although one still has definite neuronal 
pathways and regions where particular kinds of information converge, these schemes obviate the need 
for the ultra-precise and stable point-to-point synaptic connectivities and transmission paths that purely 
connectionistic systems require. 
 In several papers (Cariani, 2001, 2004) I demonstrated in simple simulated coincidence networks 
how temporally-coded signals can be detected, recognized, and extracted from signal mixtures in a 
manner that can support multiplexing and demultiplexing of signals. Recurrent timing nets readily build 
up spike correlation patterns and separate objects on the basis of temporal pattern invariances. These 
kinds of correlation-based separation strategies obviate the need for explicit feature detections that are 
then segregated and bound into separate objects. If such alternatives to connectionist networks are at all 
viable, then we may need to rethink our basic theory of neural networks. Here we will outline how these 
primitive operations might form the basis for larger networks that could subserve major brain functions. 
 
Design for a brain as a network of adaptive pattern-resonances 
 Brains are simultaneously communications networks, anticipatory correlation machines, and 
purposive, semantic engines that analyze their sensory inputs in light of previous experience to organize, 
direct, and coordinate effective action. Multiplexing permits signals to be combined nondestructively, 
broadcast, and then demultiplexed by local assemblies that are tuned to receive them. The brain can thus 
be reconceptualized, from the connectionist notion of a massive switchboard or telegraph network to 
something more like a radio broadcast network or even an internet (John, 1972). We believe that these 
basic functionalities can be implemented by global architectures that consist of many reciprocally 
connected neuronal populations. The loops support pattern amplification cycles of neuronal signals that 
allow signals to be dynamically regenerated. Ability of a system to regenerate alternative sets of neural 
signals means that the system can support alternative persistent informational states. This is critical for 
working short term memory, informational integration in global workspaces (Baars, 1988) and possibly 
also conscious awareness (P. Cariani, 2000). Stable, persistent mental states are formed from self-
stabilized regenerative signal productions (complex signal attractor states). These states constitute neural 
“pattern resonances” or an autopoiesis of neural signal productions. Some micropatterns of neural 
activity are self-reinforcing, while others are self-extinguishing. Neural resonances form in re-entrant 
pathways: in thalamocortical, cortico-cortical, hippocampal, and subcortical loops.  
                                                
12 In his seminal paper on adaptive timing networks , D. M. MacKay (1961) pointed out that temporal patterns could be 
broadcast, a coordinative strategy he called “the advertising principle.” 
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 Sensory information comes into the system 
through modality-specific sensory pathways. 
Neural sensory representations are built up 
through basic informational operations that 
integrate information in time by establishing 
circulating patterns which are continuously 
cross-correlated with incoming ones (i.e. bottom-
up/top-down interactions). When subsequent 
sensory patterns are similar to previous ones, 
these patterns are amplified and stabilized; when 
they diverge, new dynamically-created 
“templates” are formed from the difference 
between expectation and input ("mismatch 
negativities"). Tuned neural assemblies can thus 
provide top-down facilitation or inhibition of 
particular temporal patterns by adding them to 
circulating signals.  
In addition to stimulus-driven temporal 
patterns, stimulus-triggered endogenous patterns 
can be evoked by conditioned neural assemblies 
(John, 1967; Morrell, 1967) (see also the 
"cognitive timing nodes" of (MacKay, 1987)). 
Coherent temporal, spatially-distributed and 
statistical orders (“hyperneurons”) consisting of 
stimulus-driven and stimulus-triggered patterns 
have been proposed as neural substrates for global mental states ((John, 1988)). Stimulus-driven patterns 
encode the stimulus, while stimulus triggered patterns reflect its meaning, semantic and pragmatic, for 
the organism. The stimulus-triggered endogenous patterns can function as higher-level annotative "tags" 
that are added to a signal to indicate that it has a particular cognitive attribute. Neural assemblies could 
be adaptively tuned to emit new tag patterns that would mark novel combinations of perceptual, 
cognitive, conative, and mnemonic activation. New tags would constitute new symbolic primitives (P. 
Cariani, 1997) and new concepts. This may be a means by which new dedicated "perceptual symbols" 
can be formed from semantically and pragmatically meaningful iconic sensory representations 
(Barsalou, 1999). 
 Signal multiplexing, nondestructive superposition, and nonlocal storage of information permit 
broadcast strategies of neural integration. The global interconnectedness of cortical and subcortical 
structures permits widespread sharing of information that has built-up to some minimal threshold of 
global relevance, in effect creating a “global workspace” (Baars, 1988; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001). 
The contents of such a global workspace would become successively elaborated, with successive sets of 
neurons contributing their own annotations to the circulating pattern in the form of characteristic pattern-
triggered signal-tags. Such tags could then be added on to the evolving global pattern as unique 
indicators of conjunctions of meaningful events (higher-order associations).  
Traditionally, the brain has been conceived in terms of sequential hierarchies of decision processes, 
where signals represent successively more abstract aspects of a situation. As one moves to higher and 
higher centers, information about low-level properties is presumed to be discarded. A tag system, on the 
other hand, elaborates rather than reduces, continually adding additional annotative dimensions. 
Figure 6. Functional schematic of the brain as a set of pattern-
resonances coupled to an external environment. Each loop 
represents a pattern-resonance amplification-selection 
process. From (P. Cariani, 1997). 
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Depending upon attentional and motivational factors, such a system would distribute relevant 
information over wider and wider neural populations. Rather than a feed-forward hierarchy of feature-
detections and narrowing decision-trees, a system based on signal-tags would more resemble a 
heterarchy of correlational pattern-amplifiers (a la Lashley, (Orbach, 1998)) in which neural signals are 
competitively facilitated, stabilized, and broadcast to produce one dominant, elaborated pattern that 
ultimately steers the behavior of the whole. There would then be bi-directional influence between 
emergent global population-statistical patterns and those of local neural populations.  
 Neural signal tags characteristic of a given neural assembly would signify that a particular assembly 
had been activated, be it characteristic of a sensory, motor, executive, or limbic generator. Tags 
produced by sensory association cortical areas would connote sensory attributes and conjunctions; those 
produced by limbic circuits would indicate hedonic, motivational, and emotive valences, such that these 
neural signal patterns would bear pragmatic content. Linkages between particular sensory patterns and 
motivational evaluations could be formed that add tags related to previous reward or punishment history, 
thereby adding to a sensory pattern a hedonic marker. In this way, these complex, elaborated neural 
signal productions could be imbued with pragmatic meanings (“intentionality”) which could be 
conferred on sensory representations that have causal linkages with the external world (“intensionality”). 
Neural signal tags with different characteristics could thus differentiate patterns that encode the 
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic aspects of an elaborated neural activity pattern. In the wake of an 
action that had particular hedonic salience, associations between all such co-occurring tags would be 
continuously rebroadcast by hippocampal circuits and consolidated in long term memory. The system 
would thus build up learned expectations of the manifold hedonic consequences of percepts and actions. 
When similar circumstances presented themselves, temporal memory traces containing all of these 
consequences would be read out faster-than-real-time to facilitate or inhibit particular action 
alternatives, depending upon whether percept-action sequences in past experience had resulted in 
pleasure or pain. Such a reward prediction system, which computes conditional probabilities weighted 
by hedonic relevance, is capable of rapid and flexible learning. Dopamine-mediated circuits deep in our 
brains play this role of anticipatory reward prediction and the basal ganglia appear to steer both attention 
and behavior contingent on their hedonic predictions. 
Although this framework is bound to be incorrect in many respects, it does give us a way of thinking 
about the generation of new primitives in neural networks and hence also a way of thinking more 
concretely about how new concepts might arise in our brains. At this point, the theory is highly 
qualitative, somewhere between metaphor and model. It can serve both to generate hypotheses about the 
neural basis of new concepts and to provide heuristics for designing artificial, mixed analog-digital self-
organizing systems that create new internal signal primitives in an apparently open-ended fashion. 
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